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Search and Seizure
Eulis Simien, Jr. *
1. SEIZURE OF PERSONS
Minnesota v. Olson'
The Olson defendant was arrested in a home where he was staying
as an overnight guest. Claiming that his arrest violated Payton v. New
York, 2 the defendant contended the statement he gave at the police
station less than one hour after his arrest was the fruit of this allegedly
unlawful arrest. This claim brought before the Court the issue of whether
the limitations imposed in Payton apply to the arrest of an overnight
guest in the home of another.'
Rakas v. Illinois4 rejected the implications of the earlier language
in Jones v. United States5 that merely being "legitimately on [the]
premises" was sufficient to clothe a defendant with the legitimate ex-
pectations of privacy of those premises and to allow him to challenge
the priority of the entry into those premises. 6 Accordingly, courts must
now determine whether the person seeking the protection of the premises
entered by the police has "a legally sufficient interest in a place other
Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990).
2. 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980). In Payton, the Supreme Court concluded
that the arrest of that defendant after a forcible entry into his home without an arrest
warrant violated the fourth amendment. However, the arrest in a public place without a
warrant does not offend the fourth amendment. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411, 96 S. Ct. 820 (1976). If a person's arrest occurs in a private place, but one in which
that person has no legitimate expectations of privacy, then he has no right to complain
about the entry. Thus, his arrest, in so far as he is concerned, is just as though it had
taken place in a public place.
3. Had the Court applied New York v. Harris, 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990), discussed
at notes 96-106 infra, to the facts, it might have avoided the resolution of this issue.
However, the Court chose not apply Harris because the issue was not raised by the state,
which conceded at oral argument that the statement was the fruit of the arrest. 110 S.
Ct. at 1687 n.2.
4. 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978).
5. 362 U.S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725 (1960).
6. Id. at 267, 80 S. Ct. at 734.
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than his own home so that the fourth amendment protects him from
unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place." '7
Unlike Jones and Rakas, which involved issues of standing to object
to a search, the issue in Olson centered on the propriety of the defen-
dant's arrest. However, the reasoning of Olson should apply equally
when the issues involve standing to object to the admissibility of evidence
found in the home rather than the propriety of the arrest. The basis
of the Olson Court's opinion that Payton rather than Watson governed
the propriety of the arrest was its conclusion that an overnight guest
is vested with the legitimate expectations of privacy of the premises in
which he is a guest.' As such, he should have standing to object to the
entry into the premises wherein a search is conducted or evidence is
otherwise obtained (i.e., in plain view). 9
After deciding that Payton applied, the Supreme Court addressed
an issue left unresolved in Payton. Although the Payton Court concluded
that a warrant would generally be required for entry into someone's
home to make an arrest, that requirement would be excused if sufficient
exigency justified the entry.' 0 The Court, however, did not discuss how
much evidence the police must have before they may act based on the
believed existence of an exigency. The Minnesota Supreme Court de-
termined that in order to enter upon a claimed exigency, the police
must have probable cause to believe, at the time of their action, that
the exigency exists. The United States Supreme Court agreed that the
application of the probable cause standard was correct."
Justice Stevens concurred, raising an interesting point on federalism
that many have forgotten since Rakas merged the fourth amendment
7. 439 U.S. at 141-42, 99 S. Ct. at 429-30. The Rakas Court concluded that although
Jones was correctly decided, merely being "legitimately on the premises" would not give
rise to such a relationship and that this language in Jones was inappropriate. Id. at 142-
48, 99 S. Ct. at 429-33. Some commentators have questioned whether Rakas has application
beyond its facts or is limited to searches of automobiles. See, e.g., Williamson, Fourth
Amendment Standing and Expectations of Privacy: Rakas v. Illinois and New Directions
for Some Old Concepts, 31 U. Fla. L. Rev. 831, 838, 844-45 (1979). However, the example
used by the Court in Rakas specifically referred to a guest in a home, 439 U.S. at 142,
99 S. Ct. at 429-30, indicating that it applied beyond merely automobiles.
8. Minnesota v. Olson, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 1687 (1990).
9. Two issues not addressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court were also not resolved
by the United States Supreme Court, whether statements by others at the scene of the
arrest and a statement made by a co-defendant after seeing defendant's illegally obtained
statement should be suppressed. Based on Olson's legitimate expectations of privacy in
the premises entered and the fact that this additional evidence was a result of that initial
illegality, he should have had standing to object. Despite his standing, however, he might
have lost on the merits because the evidence may be considered as too attenuated to be
considered as an "exploitation of the primary illegality." United States v. Crews, 445
U.S. 463, 469, 100 S. Ct. 1244, 1249 (1980).
10. 445 U.S. 573, 587, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1381 (1980).
11. 110 S. Ct. at 1690.
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standing inquiry into the question on the merits. 12 He argued that
although a person lacks standing to assert the claim in federal court,
a state may nevertheless decide to open its courts to the claim. This
position is not inconsistent with Rakas and similar cases arising out of
state court prosecutions where the defendant seeks review in the United
States Supreme Court. Where the state court has denied the defendant's
fourth amendment claim and he seeks a federal forum to further litigate
the issue, it is appropriate for the United States Supreme Court to
determine the class of litigants to whom it will open its doors. Therefore,
Rakas' standing discussion is not inconsistent with Justice Stevens' po-
sition in Olson.
Although Justice Stevens' position is tenable even after Rakas, it
still raises some yet unresolved issues. The fourth amendment standing
inquiry is a device used to limit access to the courts and is not co-
extensive with a determination of whether the fourth amendment has
been violated. 3 As such, if the standing inquiry were viewed in isolation,
the institutional interests it is designed to protect should only be of
concern to the forum in which the issue is litigated. However, the current
view on the Court is that the exclusionary rule is not part and parcel
of the fourth amendment but merely a tool used to advance compliance
with the provision.' 4 As such, to the extent that a state court proposes
to give standing to persons other than those allowed standing in the
federal system and to allow these persons, based on a violation of
federal law, the federal exclusionary rule remedy, the standing inquiry
may become, even in state court, a federal concern. 5
It is very likely that the Court will be faced with this issue in the
near future. State courts may be used as vehicles to advance constitu-
tional rights not or no longer recognized by the federal courts. 6 To the
12. 110 S. Ct. at 1690-91 (Stevens, J., concurring).
13. When a federal court determines that a particular class of persons lacks standing
under the fourth amendment, it does so by looking to what it views as the group to
whom the fourth amendment's protections are extended. However, the determination of
that issue adversely to a claimant is not a determination that the commands of the fourth
amendment have remained inviolate. It is only a determination that this claimant's fourth
amendment interests were not implicated and he has no right to request the court to
make the determination as to whether someone else's rights have been violated.
14. See Simien, The Interrelationship of the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and
Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 487, 526-39 (1988).
15. This issue cannot be fully explored in this recent developments piece and I merely
raise the issue, leaving its further discussion for the future.
16. See Devlin, State Constitutional Autonomy Rights in an Age of Federal Re-
trenchment: Some Thoughts on the Interpretation of State Rights Derived from Federal
Sources, in 3 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 195 (1990); Williams, Meth-




extent that the expansion of constitutional rights is based on adequate
and independent state grounds, no substantial federal question is pre-
sented.1 7 However, to the extent that the expansion results not from an
adequate and independent state ground but from an expansion of the
class of persons entitled to assert a violation of federal law, the propriety
of this approach has not been settled.
Alabama v. White"8
In White, the defendant consented to the search of her car. She
claimed, however, that the consent was the fruit of an illegal stop. 9
Accordingly, the Supreme Court had to determine whether the police
had sufficient articulable suspicion to stop the defendant.
The defendant's stop was based on an anonymous tip, which was
totally lacking in evidence from which one could conclude that the caller
was honest and his information reliable, leading the Court to conclude
that this tip, standing alone, was not sufficient to justify the stop under
Terry v. Ohio.20 Despite this conclusion, it found that the stop was
justified. It reasoned that the tip and the corroborating information
obtained by the police did constitute articulable suspicion, justifying a
brief investigatory stop.2 The analysis used was very similar to that
employed in Illinois v. Gates22-the corroboration of some information
tended to add credence to the other information, making it more likely
that the tip information about the defendant's illegal activity was reli-
able.23
White is significant because it appears to be the first time that the
Court has used the Gates "totality of the circumstances" approach to
17. See Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 750
(1972).
18. 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990).
19. 110 S. Ct. at 2414.
20. See discussion of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968) in White,
110 S. Ct. at 2415-16. The Court did, however, leave open the possibility that some
anonymous tips might be sufficient to justify a Terry stop. 110 S. Ct. at 2415.
21. 110 S. Ct. at 2417.
22. 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). Gates involved the determination of whether
a search warrant could be validly issued on the basis of an anonymous tip which was
corroborated by independent investigation and observation. White involved the determi-
nation whether a brief investigatory stop was justified, which requires only articulable
suspicion rather than probable cause.
23. Just- as in Gates, the tip was corroborated by acts which, other than for the
suspicion raised by the tip, objectively appeared totally innocent. Also just as in Gates,
some of the facts as related in the tip were inconsistent with the facts observed by the
police prior to the stop (i.e., according to the tip defendant was supposed to carry the




determine the sufficiency of an officer's factual justification in a non-
warrant context. Since White was concerned with the sufficiency of the
factual basis to justify a brief investigatory seizure, it did not employ
the "totality of the circumstances" approach to test probable cause.
The Court instead used the approach to test whether the officers had
sufficient articulable suspicion. All indications in the White opinion,
however, are that even when the issue surrounds the determination of
probable cause in a non-warrant context the "totality of the circum-
stances" approach will be used.2 4
The "totality of the circumstances" approach may have significant
merit in the warrant context. 25 However, there is good reason why it
may not be an appropriate substitute for the Aguilar/Spinelli test where
a non-warrant determination of probable cause is being reviewed. At
least for searches, warrants are the preferred method of operation. 26 If
the more restrictive Aguilar/Spinelli approach were used when an officer
acted, despite the practicality of obtaining a warrant, without a warrant,
he would be encouraged to go through the warrant process, where the
relaxed "totality of the circumstances" approach would be applied.
This argument carries less force for non-warrant seizures than it
does for non-warrant searches. Despite the Court's preference for search
warrants, there are indications in the Court's precedent that no such
preference exists for seizures. 27 Therefore, for seizures there is less of
a justification for developing rules that will encourage officers to obtain
warrants in order to execute seizures.
28
24. Despite the fact that it was not necessary to discuss probable cause in White,
the Court's discussion of Gates refers to it as a case concerning the determination of-
probable cause (without limiting that discussion to the warrant context). 110 S. Ct. at
2415-17. Nor is there any indication that the test will be reserved to testing the factual
justification for a search, as was in issue in Gates.
25. See criticism of the approach gleaned from Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84
S. Ct. 1509 (1964) and Spinelli v: United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969) in
Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-41, 103 S. Ct. at 2328-33.
26. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105-06, 85 S. Ct. 741, 744 (1965).
27. There is a presumption that a non-warrant search is unconstitutional. There is
no such presumption for seizures. Compare See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543,
87 S. Ct. 1737, 1739 (1967) and Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312, 98 S.
Ct. 1816, 1820 (1978) with United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S. Ct. 820 (1976).
28. There was one other point discussed in Gates which should be noted. That Court
concluded that a reviewing court should give deference to the issuing magistrate's probable
cause determination. It concluded that even if the reviewing court does not agree with
the determination of probable cause, it should not reverse the finding so long as there
is a "substantial basis for concluding" that probable cause existed. 462 U.S. 213, 236,
103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983). However, in the non-warrant context, there is no reason
for an application of the deferential review.
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Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz29
Last term, the Supreme Court settled the debate over the validity
of road blocks, a popular device in the battle against intoxicated drivers.
As a general rule, some level of particularized suspicion is required
before the government is allowed to intrude upon an individual's fourth
amendment protected interests by a search or seizure.30 By definition,
road blocks involve the seizure of at least some persons as to whom
there is no particularized suspicion. In Delaware v. Prouse,3 the Supreme
Court held that the fourth amendment was violated when police officers
determine which vehicles are to be stopped even though they lack par-
ticularized articulable suspicion. However, the Court also noted that it
might find that there would be no violation if the stops are made
pursuant to well-organized administrative guidelines.12
In Sitz, the Court specifically held what was implied in Prouse3
The Court held that since the Michigan stops were based on well-
organized administrative guidelines, they did not violate the fourth
amendment despite the lack of any particularized suspicion to justify
the stops. The Court reasoned that there are significant governmental
interests in apprehending and deterring intoxicated drivers and that road
blocks are effective tools in achieving these interests. Balanced against
these interests is what the Court characterized as the insubstantial in-
trusion into the fourth amendment protected interests suffered by the
stopped drivers. Finding that the government's interests outweighed the
individual's fourth amendment interests, the Court concluded that the
intrusion was reasonable.34
The Sitz reasoning was based on a bifurcation of the two clauses
of the fourth amendment first articulated in Terry.35 In explaining why
a diminished level of particularized suspicion was sufficient to justify a
brief investigatory detention, the Court in Terry reasoned that the fourth
amendment is made up of two independent clauses.3 6 Under this rea-
29. l10 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
30. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966).
31. 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
32. Id. at 663, 99 S. Ct. at 1401.
33. The Court's inquiry was limited to the initial stop and not the level of factual
justification needed to detain "particular motorists for more extensive field sobriety
testing," which the Court found "may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion
standard." 110 S. Ct. at 2485.
34. Id. at 2484-85.
35. See supra note 20.
36. Under the Terry Court's reasoning, the first clause of the fourth amendment
provides that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated;" whereas the
second clause of the amendment provides, "and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
[Vol. 51
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soning, the second clause of the fourth amendment, relating to the
warrant requirement, mandates a probable cause inquiry. However, the
reasoning goes on to allow a bifurcation of this clause from the first
clause, which the Court concluded only requires that the intrusion not
be "unreasonable." Since all that was required in Terry was that the
detention be reasonable, rather than supported by probable cause, that
Court found that a short investigatory detention did not violate the
fourth amendment if supported by articulable suspicion, a lesser level
of suspicion than probable cause.317 Although Terry, involving particu-
larized suspicion (merely at a lower level), is distinguishable from Sitz,
the reasoning of the Sitz Court is consistent with the earlier bifurcation
of the fourth amendment. 38
Sitz is.not the first time the Court has used the bifurcation reasoning
to justify an intrusion into fourth amendment interests without any
particularized factual justification. In 1989, the same reasoning was used
in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab 9 and Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Association.4° Both of these cases allowed
drug testing of individuals-a search under the fourth amendment anal-
ysis-despite the lack of particularized suspicion.4' However, those cases
dealt with administrative searches rather than action aimed at appre-
hending criminal defendants and investigation of crimes. 42 Such admin-
istrative action has traditionally been judged by a different standard
than criminal investigation. 43
In Sitz, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the notion that only
in the context of administrative searches and seizures may the State act
without any particularized suspicion. In so doing, it relied upon United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte." However, this reliance was not well-founded.
In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court ruled that the stopping of all cars that
passed through an administratively-fixed check point near the Mexican-
American border did not violate the fourth amendment. It further al-
lowed some of those cars to be pulled over for brief questioning "even
37. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968).
38. My admission that Sitz is consistent with Terry's bifurcation should not be viewed
as an endorsement of the approach. This bifurcation is subject to substantial criticism.
For a more detailed discussion of Terry, see Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment
Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 383 (1988).
39. 489 U.S. 656, 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
40. 489 U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
41. For a discussion of these cases, see Simien, Developments in the Law, 1988-1989,
Criminal Procedure, 50 La. L. Rev. 229, 232-33 (1989).
42. An administrative search or seizure "serves special governmental needs, beyond
the normal need for law enforcement." Von Raab, 489 U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1390.
43. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387
U.S. 523, 67 S. Ct. 1727 (1967).
44. 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976).
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though there [was] no reason to believe the particular vehicle contain[ed]
illegal aliens. ' 45 A border or near border search for illegal aliens may
result in criminal prosecutions. However, a border or near border search
usually "serves special governmental needs, beyond, the normal need for
law enforcement."46 It is designed to protect the integrity of the borders.
To this extent it should be viewed as an administrative search and
therefore, under current jurisprudence, subject to a different analysis
than a search or seizure in the context of a criminal investigation.4 7 In
addition, Martinez-Fuerte is distinguishable because the mere fact that
a border crossing is involved has been used to apply different standards
than if there had been no border crossing.48
In State v. Church,49 the Louisiana Supreme Court anticipated the
ruling in Sitz. It, however, ruled that even if DWI road blocks established
pursuant to well-organized administrative guidelines satisfy federal con-
stitutional requirements, they violate article 1, section 5 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974. The Church opinion is subject to at least two
readings. The first reading is a rejection of the Sitz thesis that allows
an intrusion into fourth amendment interests without the showing of
particularized suspicion10 As though this rejection of the Sitz thesis were
not sufficient to support its conclusion that road blocks violate the
Louisiana Constitution, however, the Church court went on to review
the efficacy of road blocks in apprehending and deterring drunk drivers,
45, Id. at 545, 96 S. Ct. at 3077.
46. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 1390.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
48. C.f., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538, 105 S. Ct.
3304, 3309 (1985) ("Consistently, therefore, with Congress' power to protect the Nation
by stopping and examining persons entering this country, the Fourth Amendment's balance
of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the international border than in the interior.").
Compare Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524 (1886) (mail originating in
and to be delivered within the United States is protected by the fourth amendment probable
cause requirement) With United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 97 S. Ct. 1972 (1977)
(mail originating outside the United States may be opened and read based upon "reasonable
cause to suspect" that merchandise or contraband may be found inside); also, compare
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968) (brief investigatory detention is only
allowed if the officer has articulable suspicion to believe that the detainee has committed
or is about to commit an offense) with Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 538, 105
S. Ct. at 3309 ("Routine searches of the 'persons and effects of entrants are not subject
to any requirement of reasonable suspicion.").
In their dissenting opinions,. Justices Brennan and Stevens point out other distinctions
between Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte. 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488-90 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Id. at 2492-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. 538 So. 2d 993 (La. '1989).
50. The Church Court pointed out that "[b]efore a police officer may stop a person
for investigatory purposes he must reasonably suspect that the person has committed or
is about to commit a criminal offense." Id. at 997 (quoting from State v. Matthews, 366
So. 2d 1348, 1351 (La. 1978)).
412 [Vol. 51
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concluding that they are' not very effective.51 This raises the question
of whether, despite the indications to the contrary, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court might be willing to use the balancing test approach to
eliminate the particularized suspicion requirement if the State can prove
sufficient State interests and that the challenged conduct is sufficiently
tailored to achieving those interests.
II. SrnzuREs OF THINGS
Horton v. California2
In Horton, the search warrant executed by the officer only authorized
the search for proceeds of a robbery in which the defendant was believed
to have been engaged. In executing the warrant the officer also desired
to look for and find the weapons used 3 However, he looked in no
place that the warrant did not justify in the search for the proceeds.
When the officer found the weapons during this search, he seized them.
The defendant argued that inadvertence was required and that the sub-
jective intent of the officer negated the validity of the plain view seizure
of the weapons. The Supreme Court rejected his argument.
Although inadvertence was often referred to as a requirement of
plain view searches and seizures, for the so called "plain view searches"
it had already been eliminated . 4 After this elimination, it would appear
that the only function to be served by the inadvertence requirement for
plain view seizures would be as a justification for the physical intrusion
into the fourth amendment protected area from which the seizure is
made." This proposition was confirmed in Horton. Since the intrusion
into the fourth amendment protected area was already justified in Horton
by the warrant, there was no need for inadvertence.
51. 538 So. 2d at 997.
52. 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).
53. It should be noted that, as pointed out in Justice Brennan's dissent, the Court
was not faced with the situation of a complete pretextual search (where officer was not
interested in finding the proceeds but only looking to discover the weapons). 110 S. Ct.
at 2313 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 109 S. Ct. 693 (1989).
55. This is no argument for the underlying validity of the elimination of the inad-
vertence requirement for plain view searches, which presents a completely different question.
It is merely an acknowledgement that acceptance of the validity of the elimination of
inadvertence for plain view searches substantially limits the interests that inadvertence can
legitimately serve for plain view seizures.
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III. SEARCHES OF PLACES/THINGS
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez'
The defendant in Verdugo-Urquidez was a nonresident alien sus-
pected of being a leader of a large, violent Mexican organization believed
to be engaged in smuggling narcotics into the United States. Based on
a complaint charging narcotic related offenses, the defendant was being
held in custody in the United States. During that custody and pursuant
to an agreement between the Mexican government and the Drug En-
forcement Agency, DEA agents and Mexican authorities went to and
searched the defendant's residence in Mexico without a search warrant.The issue presented to the Court was a narrow one, "whether the
fourth amendment applies to the search and seizure by United States
agents of property owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign
country."" In answer to this issue, the Court held that the fourth
amendment was not applicable to the conduct and therefore was not
violated, finding that, at least for non-residents, the Constitution does
not have extra-territorial effect.58
Although the issue presented to the Court was a very narrow one,
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a five member majority, took the op-
portunity to point out that there is some question about the applicability
of the fourth amendment to aliens even if the alleged unconstitutional
conduct takes place within this country. Relying upon the language of
the preamble and fourth amendment, Justice Rehnquist indicated that
the fourth amendment "refers to a class of persons who are part of a
56. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
57. Id. at 1059.
58. There is some support for the Court's conclusion, that the Constitution does not
have extra-territorial effect, at least where non-residents are concerned. C.f., Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 70 S. Ct. 936 (1950) (habeas corpus provision does not apply
to aliens convicted and held in foreign country after conviction for war crimes). The
Court distinguished a fourth amendment claim from one based in the fifth amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 92 S. Ct. 1653 (1972), the Court noted that even when this privilege is violated by
pretrial conduct, the constitutional violation occurs when the evidence is admitted at the
trial. However, the Court reasoned that the fourth amendment is different because it
"prohibits 'unreasonable searches and seizures' whether or not the evidence is sought to
be used in a criminal trial, and a violation of the Amendment is 'fully accomplished' at
the time of an unreasonable governmental intrusion." 110 S. Ct. at 1060.
As additional support for its conclusions, the Court relied upon a dearth of evidence
that the framers intended the fourth amendment to apply to extra-territorial searches of
the property of foreign nationals and language in the Constitution's preamble and the
fourth amendment itself. 110 S. Ct. at 1060-61.
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national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient con-
nection with this country to be considered part of that community." 9
He went on to state that it is yet unsettled "how the Court would rule
on a fourth amendment claim by illegal aliens in the United States if
such a claim were squarely before [it]. ' 60
To the extent that this questioning of the applicability of the fourth
amendment was intended to apply not only to aliens within the United
States and governmental conduct outside the United States but also to
governmental conduct within the United States, it is, to say the least,
surprising. To find that the fourth amendment does not apply to the
search or seizure of an alien within this country would be inconsistent
with the express assumption of the Court in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza.61
It would also be inconsistent with the reasoning employed in a host of
other cases, where the Court analyzed the governmental treatment of
aliens under fourth amendment standards. 62
This reasoning also raises questions about what other rights might
be construed as limited to that "class of persons who are part of a
national community. ' 63 There are several other references in the Con-
stitution to "the people." In fact, Justice Rehnquist's opinion states,
"While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that
'the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and
Second Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to [this class of people]." 16 5
Justice Kennedy, the fifth member to join in the opinion, also
specially concurred." He specifically renounced the part of Justice Rehn-
quist's opinion which might be construed as limiting the application of
the fourth amendment to residents of the United States and would
59. 110 S. Ct. at 1061. The preamble starts off with the phrase, "[w]e the People
of the United States" and the fourth amendment provides for the protection of the "right
of the people to be secure."
60. 110 S. Ct. at 1065.
61. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S. Ct. 3479 (1984). However, as the
Court noted, the assumption of an antecedent proposition when it grants certiorari is not
binding on future cases. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1064 (1990).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 105 S. Ct.
3304 (1985).
63. 110 S. Ct. at 1061.
64. See, e.g., first amendment ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the
right of the people peaceably to assemble"); second amendment ("right of the people to
keep and bear Arms"); ninth amendment (enumeration shall not be construed to "deny
or disparage other rights retained by the people"); tenth amendment (powers not delegated
nor prohibited "are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.") (emphasis
added). C.f., United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292, 24 S. Ct. 719,
723 (1904) (Excludable alien is not entitled to first amendment rights, because "[hie does
not become one of the people to whom these things are secured by our Constitution by
an attempt to enter, forbidden by law").
65. 110 S. Ct. at 1061 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at 1066 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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provide the same protections to all persons searched or seized within
the territorial limits of this country.67 He also indicated that the appli-
cation of the Constitution should not be limited to the territory of the
United States. He would simply find that there is substantially more
flexibility in the scope of the coverage of the Constitution in foreign
countries. 68 The approach he would use for extra-territorial conduct
appears to be very similar to the old fundamental rights approach to
incorporation of the bill of rights under the fourteenth amendment due
process clause. 69
Because of Justice Kennedy's special concurrence, it might first
appear that there is no majority for the proposition that more than
mere physical presence and the governmental conduct within this country
is necessary for the fourth amendment to apply to non-resident aliens.
Only five members (counting Justice Kennedy) joined in the opinion.
Justice Kennedy, however, disagreed with that part of the opinion which
required some additional nexus between an alien searched or seized
within this country before protection of the fourth amendment is ap-
plicable.70 Despite this disagreement, there may still be a majority for
this proposition. Justice Stevens also concurred (but did not join in the
opinion) and seemed to implicitly agree with the nexus requirement even
where the governmental conduct takes place in this country.
Justice Stevens concluded that the defendant in Verdugo-Urquidez
had the right to object to the search because he was "among those
'people' who are entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights." '7' It
is impossible to tell from Justice Stevens' very short opinion whether
he would require more than physical presence when the conduct giving
rise to the fourth amendment claim actually takes place in the United
States. However, Justice Stevens does not expressly draw any distinction
between searches conducted in or out of the United States, leaving the
implication that he' would treat these in the same manner.
If, as it appears, Justice Stevens agrees with this proposition, the
next inquiry is how much of a nexus would be required before an alien
searched or seized in this country may assert the protection of the fourth
amendment. Although the "majority" opinion would appear to require
a substantial nexus between the alien and this country before the fourth
67. Id. at 1066-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205 (1952).
70. Since he also disagreed with'the conclusion that the fourth amendment has no
extra-territorial effect, U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1066 (1990), and no
other member of the Court expressly joined the remaining members of the "majority"
on this issue, this aspect of what is reported as the opinion of the Court only received
four votes.
71. Id. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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amendment applies," Justice Stevens would be the swing vote on this
issue. His view of the required nexus seems to be somewhat relaxed
from the indications in the "majority" opinion. He indicates that as
long as the alien is legally within this country he would find a sufficient
nexus for the alien to take advantage of the protection of the fourth
amendment. 7
One question not addressed by the Court is what effect its reasoning
might have in the context of a search or seizure of property owned by
United States residents but located in foreign countries. Much of the
Court's discussion about the fourth amendment protecting a community
of people indicates that the right is personal rather than territorial.
Under this reasoning, the search or seizure of property outside this
country but belonging to a member of the community would be judged
by fourth amendment standards. This would be consistent with the result
reached in Reid v. Covert,74 where the court held that the fifth and
sixth amendments applied to military trials of non-military persons in
foreign lands.7s In the Verdugo-Urquidez opinion, however, Justice Rehn-
quist points out that only four Justices in Reid "reject[ed] the idea that
when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free
.72. Justice Rehnquist's opinion refers to a series of cases where constitutional pro-
tections were provided to resident aliens. See, e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344
U.S. 590, 73 S. Ct. 472 (1953) and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064
(1886). However, he never indicated that formal resident alien status is a necessary finding,
only that the cases establish "that aliens receive constitutional protections when they have
come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with
this country." 110 S. Ct: at 1064.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion specifically rejects the notion that a short-term lawful but
involuntary presence is a sufficient nexus to allow the alien to seek the protections of
the fourth amendment. It leaves open the questions of whether lawful voluntary presence
or a long-term lawful but involuntary presence are sufficient. As discussed above, it implies
that illegal presence is not. Id. at 1064-65.
73. "In my opinion aliens who are lawfully present in the United States are among
those 'people' who are entitled to the protections of the Bill of Rights." 110 S. Ct. at
1068 (Stevens, J., concurring).
A related issue left unresolved by Verdugo-Urquidez is what result should be reached
if the police engage in a search of property within the United States that belongs to a
foreign national. In this scenario, the extra-territorial effect of the Constitution is not
implicated. However, if the "community of people" language is followed, it would appear
that the fourth amendment would not be applicable. Justice Kennedy indicated that "[he
would) have little doubt that the full protections of the Fourth Amendment would apply."
Id. at 1067-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, the other swing vote on this
issue, gave no indication of his views on this issue.
74. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 S. Ct. 1222 (1957).
75. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318, 57 S.
Ct. 216, 220 (1936) ("Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it
have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens") (emphasis
added).
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of the Bill of Rights." '76 He then notes that the result in Reid was, in
part, due to the concurrences of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan who
resolved the issue on narrower due process grounds. 7 Additionally, the
opinion's distinction between the fourth and fifth amendment might also
be instructive here.
78
Florida v. Wells7 9
Wells is one of the rare cases in recent fourth amendment adju-
dication where there was unanimous agreement within the Supreme Court
on the result. All members of the Court agreed that the search of closed
containers during the course of an inventory search, under the facts of
that case, violated the Constitution. Justice Rehnquist, writing the opin-
ion for the Court, concluded that absent established routine or standard
criteria indicating whether containers could be opened during an inven-
tory search, the officer conducting the search who chose to open con-
tainers was granted too much discretion, resulting in a violation of the
Constitution.80 However, this opinion specifically rejected the notion that'
the established routine or standard criteria must eliminate all discre-
tionary authority to open containers by either providing that all con-
tainers be opened or that all remain closed.8" The opinion was not
specific as to precisely how much discretion was too much, and this
issue will have to await further development.
The concurring opinions in Wells were critical of Justice Rehnquist's
opinion because they claimed that the only issue before the Court was
whether the opening of the containers in that case-with no established
routine or standard criteria that allowed it-was valid. They argued that
it was not necessary to discuss whether some discretion might still be
reserved to the officer without violating the fourth amendment.,2 Justices
Brennan and Stevens also contended that the majority's conclusions went
beyond Colorado v. Bertine,s1 which had previously been considered the
76. U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1063 (1990) (quoting Reid, 354 U.S.
at 5, 77 S. Ct. at 1225) (emphasis provided by Court).
77. Id.
78. See supra text accompanying note 58, discussing the Court's conclusion that any
fourth amendment violation is complete at the time of the unlawful search or seizure
(outside the United States) and therefore, possibly not subject to fourth amendment
limitations.
79. Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990).
80. Id. at 1634-35.
81. Id. at 1635.
82. Id. at 1637 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 1639 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
83. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987).
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high mark on the authority of officers to exercise discretion in the
context of an inventory search.84
Depending on exactly what was meant by Justice Rehnquist's com-
ments that the officer may be allowed discretion in deciding whether
to open containers, the concurrences' criticism that the comments are
an extension of Bertine may or may not be correct. If the comments
merely mean that the officer may be given some discretion about opening
containers but the discretion must be exercised within established routine
or standard criteria, they are merely the logical extension of Bertine.
In Bertine, the officer was given some discretion (within guidelines) as
to the decisions whether and how to impound, which decisions deter-
mined whether he could conduct an inventory search and open containers
during the search. Assuming the correctness of Bertine, it would only
be logical that the officer should be allowed some discretion (within
similar guidelines) as to whether to open containers-that would merely
be directly allowing the officer to do what he is indirectly allowed to
do under Bertine. If on the other hand, Wells is read to mean that the
officer's discretion need not be limited by guidelines but only that the
established routines or standard criteria must authorize the opening of
containers, then it expands Bertine. At least in Bertine there were guide-
lines which the officer was to follow in exercising the discretion; there-
fore, his decision about impoundment, which ultimately determined
whether he could open containers, was not unfettered.
Maryland v. Buie"5
A valid plain view seizure can only take place where the thing seized
is seen and seized from a place in which the officer has a right to be.
The police in Buie entered the defendant's home in order to arrest him
for robbery pursuant to an arrest warrant. No search warrant was issued
authorizing the search of the house. However, instead of exiting from
the house immediately after the arrest, one of the officers went into
the basement from which the defendant had exited immediately prior
to the arrest. There the officer saw a shirt which fit the description of
one worn by one of the robbery suspects. 6 This shirt was seized and
84. Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1637 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at
1639 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court in Bertine upheld the inventory search of an
automobile despite the fact that the regulations under which it was seized allowed the
officer some discretion, within guidelines, as to whether to impound and the type of
impoundment. The type of impoundment chosen would, in turn, determine the permissible
scope of the inventory search. However, under the regulations in force in the Bertine
case, opening of containers was specifically provided for when the car was impounded
in the manner chosen by the officer.
85. Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990).
86. The officer testified that the entry was made just "in case there was someone
else" in the basement. Id. at 1095.
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entered into evidence at the defendant's trial. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court was faced with the issue of the officer's right to enter the
basement.
Justice White, writing for the majority, concluded that the entry
into the basement may have been proper. This conclusion was based
on the authority of police, under limited circumstances, to conduct a
protective sweep without violating the fourth amendment.8 7 Using a
balancing test, ss the Court rejected the defendant's contention that, even
if the warrant requirement were relaxed, the proper test for determining
whether the police could enter other parts of his home after the arrest
was probable cause.8 9 The Court instead held that a protective sweep
may be conducted if the police have articulable suspicion that there may
be a person in the area to be swept who might pose a danger to the
officers. 90 However, even where the sweep is authorized, the search is
limited to a cursory inspection of those areas where a person may be
found rather than a full scale search. 9' Finally, the Court concluded
that the sweep could last no longer than necessary to dispel reasonable
fear and could not last longer than the arrest and exit. 9
Although the Court was fairly detailed in its delineation of the scope
of a proper protective sweep, it still left many questions unanswered.
One of those questions is what authority police will have to conduct a
protective sweep of a home when the arrest is made just outside, rather
than within, the home. This issue could arise where the police arrest a
suspect outside his home and have reason to believe that a sniper is
inside who will pose a risk of danger as they attempt to bring the
suspect to the police car. In Vale v. Louisiana,93 the Court held that
where an arrest is made outside the home, the officers may not enter
to conduct a search even if they have probable cause. Vale is, however,
distinguishable. In Vale, the claimed justification for the entry was
acquisition of evidence rather than the protection of the officers. The
State has more significant interests in the protection of its police officers
than in the acquisition of evidence. Thus, if the Court uses a balancing
test, as it is so apt to do in fourth amendment adjudication, it could
distinguish Vale on that basis.
87. The Court defined a protective sweep as "a quick and limited search of a premises,
incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others. It
is narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person
might be hiding." Id. at 1094.
88. Id. at 1097-99.
89. Id. at 1095.
90. Id. at 1098.
91. Id. at 1099.
92. Id.
93. 399 U.S. 30, 90 S. Ct. 1969 (1970).
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Another very significant unanswered question is whether there is any
limit on the areas of the house in which officers may legitimately sweep.
In Buie, the sweep was in the basement from which the defendant had
just exited. The limitation placed upon the sweep-"no longer than. is
necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event
no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart" 94-would
imply that the police will not be allowed to create their right to sweep
into any areas except those to which the suspicion relates. However,
once a reasonable suspicion of danger is found, it would not appear
to niatter that the area is not the one from which the defendant emerged
or even not one in close proximity thereto.
A related question is raised by the fact that as police are emerging
from a house, the egress they choose may create circumstances that
justify articulable suspicion of danger from areas of the house from
which they could not have reasonably feared danger at the time and
place of the arrest. In order to justify a protective: sweep into these
additional areas, will courts now require that the officers justify the
method of egress and demonstrate that the method chosen was not
merely used to allow entry into additional areas? If the limitations upon
the scope of the protective sweep are to be effective, courts must be
willing to at least consider the reason the police chose one means of
egress over other alternatives (i.e., Was it merely a ploy designed to
create the right to sweep?). 9
IV. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
In the last term, the United States Supreme Court sent out conflicting
signals on the continued viability of the exclusionary rule for fourth
amendment violations. If Harris v. New York" were read in isolation,
one would surely think that the end of the slow death of the rule that
was once viewed as part and parcel of the fourth amendment 97 and then
94. 110 S. Ct. at 1099.
95. Other limitations might result from a fairly strict reading of the articulable
suspicion standard. In Buie, the police had probable cause to believe that the defendant
and a confederate had recently committed a violent crime and knew that the defendant
had just emerged from the basement. The Supreme Court found that these facts were
sufficient to justify an articulable suspicion that there might be danger lurking in the
basement.
Justice Stevens suggested that the scope of the protective sweep should also be limited
by burden allocation. He concluded that the burden of proof should be upon the State
to prove that there was a reasonable basis for a police officers' articulable suspicion and
that the action taken was a reasonable means of protecting themselves. Id. at 1100 (Stevens,
J., concurring). Justice Kennedy specifically disagreed with Justice Stevens' comments. Id.
at 1101 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96. New York v. Harris, 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990).
97. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).
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relegated to being a prophylactic, justified only by its deterrent effect, 98
was not long in coming. However, James v. Illinois" indicates that the
plug to the respirator has not yet been pulled.
Harris v. New York
In Harris, the police were in possession of sufficient facts to justify
a probable cause to arrest the defendant. However, since he was arrested
in his home and without a warrant, the arrest was in violation of Payton
v. New York.' °° Despite the violation of Payton, the Court concluded
that the defendant's statement made after he was removed from the
house and advised of his rights under Arizona v. Miranda'0 1 could be
used in the prosecution's case in chief at the defendant's trial.
It is significant to note that although the arrest was without the
benefit of a warrant, the police had probable cause. When the police
make an arrest without probable cause, there is no lawful justification
for the initial seizure or subsequent detention of the defendant. There-
fore, if a statement is made during that seizure or detention, it is
inadmissible unless it is sufficiently attenuated from the illegal seizure
or detention.'02 The Court reasoned that the same is not true for a
violation of Payton. According to the Court's reasoning in Harris,
Payton is designed to protect the integrity of the home and is not
directly related to the authority to seize and maintain custody of the
person. 0 13 Although acknowledging that there is a "but for" causal
connection between the intrusion into the integrity of the home (the
Payton protection) and the subsequent acquisition of the statement, the
Court did not find the connection sufficient to warrant the imposition
of the exclusionary rule for a statement obtained once the intrusion has
ceased. '°4 Under those facts, the Court reasoned, evidence is not a
"product of the illegal governmental activity"' 15 and should not be
excluded.
Harris should be distinguished from a case in which the officers
obtain the statement while still within the unlawfully entered residence.
If the defendant makes the statement in the house, then presumably,
98. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
99. James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648 (1990).
100. 455 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).
101. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
102. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2564 (1980).
103. New York v. Harris, 110 S. Ct. 1640, 1643 (1990).
104. Id. at 1643-44.
105. Id. at 1643 (quoting United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471, 100 S. Ct. 1244,
1250 (1980)). See also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975); bunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687,
102 S. Ct. 2664 (1982).
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unless otherwise attenuated, it would be a fruit of the continuing vio-
lation of the integrity of the home. The same reasoning would allow
the defendant standing to argue the inadmissibility of any evidence
obtained from within the home. As the Court pointed out, the "warrant
requirement for an arrest in the home is imposed to protect the home,
and anything incriminating the police gathered from arresting Harris in
his home ... has been excluded, as it should have been . ".1.. 6
James v. Illinois
In James, a statement was obtained from the defendant following
an illegal arrest. When the defendant called a witness to the stand to
testify, the prosecution used the defendant's statement to impeach the
testimony of the defense witness. Distinguishing Harris v. New York,107
the Supreme Court held that the prosecution should not have been
allowed to impeach the witness with the defendant's statement.The Court reasoned that the expansion of the rule would unnec-
essarily chill the defendant's right to present testimony.10 The Court
concluded that this reasoning is consistent with the notion that the
defendant has no right to present perjured testimony.1°9 In reaching this
conclusion the Court relied upon the presumption that a witness sworn
to tell the truth will do so, and, to the extent that the witness would
not otherwise tell the truth, a potential perjury prosecution is a sufficient
deterrent." 0
The Court also reasoned that in many instances the defendant may
not be involved in and will not know whether the witness will testify
inconsistently with the defendant's prior statement. It may turn out that
the witness would testify truthfully or otherwise not inconsistently with
the defendant's prior statement. Unlike the control a defendant has over
his own testimony, however, the defendant has no control over what a
witness will say on the witness stand. Therefore, the defendant may be
chilled-out of fear that the witness might say something inconsistent
with his illegally seized statement and thereby open the door to the
106. 110 S. Ct. at 1644 (emphasis added).
107. 401 U.S. 222, 91 S. Ct: 643 (1971). In Harris, the defendant had been illegally
arrested and gave a statement, which was considered as the fruit of that illegal arrest.
Although noting that the statement was inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief,
the Supreme Court concluded that the statement could be used to impeach the defendant
who testified inconsistently with the illegally obtained statement.
108. James v, Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648, 653 (1990).
109. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
110. 110 S. Ct. at 652-53. The Court found that the impeachment of the defendant
was more justified because of the defendant's increased interests' in providing self-serving
testimony and because, depending on the offense charged, the defendant may lose more
by not risking a perjury conviction.
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admission of that statement for impeachment-from presenting what he
hopes to be truthful, rather than perjured testimony.'
The Court also reasoned that by expanding the scope of the exception
to the exclusionary rule there would be a corresponding diminution in
the rule's deterrent effect."12 The Court then concluded that even if the
expansion of the Harris impeachment exception might reduce the oc-
currences of perjury (with or without complicity of the defendant), the
benefit would not be sufficient to outweigh the loss in deterrence." 3
There is at least one additional argument that the Court did not
use but might have been persuasive. When the Harris exception is used,
the defendant is already on the stand testifying. Thus, if his statement
is used to impeach him, 'he has the opportunity to give his version of
the circumstances surrounding the statement and explain why the trial
court testimony is more accurate. If an exception were recognized which
would allow impeachment of other witnesses, it would put the defendant
in the horns of the dilemma of having to choose between two consti-
tutional rights. The defendant might be forced to choose between his
right to present evidence under the sixth amendment' '4 and his right not
to take the stand under the fifth amendment." 5 Because the witness
might testify inconsistently with the illegally seized statement, expansion
of the impeachment exception would put the defendant in the position
of knowing that his prior illegally seized statement might be presented
to the jury as impeachment. If so, the illegally seized statement would
be unexplained unless the defendant were to waive his fifth amendment
right and take the stand to explain it. Forcing this sort of choice between
two constitutional rights might violate due process." 6
State v. Brumfield 17
In Brumfield, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal used a
very questionable inevitable discovery analysis to hold admissible evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment and article 1, section 5
of the Louisiana Constitution."8 The officer who searched the car from
which the evidence was obtained testified that the search was not con-
111. Id. at 653-54.
112. Id. at 654.
113. Id.
114. See Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S. Ct. 351 (1972).
115. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 101 S. Ct. 1112 (1981).
116. Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S. Ct. 967 (1968) (compelling
a choice between the fourth and fifth amendment protections by allowing the use of
defendant's suppression hearing testimony at trial violates the due process clause).
117. 560 So. 2d '534 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 565 So. 2d 942 (1990).
118. The inevitable discovery doctrine was adopted and discussed in'Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984).
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ducted for inventory purposes, leading the court to conclude that the
requirements for a valid inventory search had not been proven." 9 The
court, however, concluded that the evidence was still admissible because
had the search been conducted for inventory purposes, the inventory
search would have been permissible.
This analysis is not appropriate. It completely undermines the de-
terrent effect of the exclusionary rule. Allowing the admission of the
evidence simply because it could have been properly obtained by a lawful
search does nothing to encourage police officers to conform their conduct
to the requirements of the federal and state constitutions. Additionally,
it affirmatively discourages them to take the extra effort often necessary
to do so. If the evidence is admissible so long as the officer could have
properly found it, there is no incentive to make sure that the proper
steps are taken to search for the evidence. The inevitable discovery
doctrine, based in the same principles as the independent source rule, 2
0
should only be applicable when the evidence would have been discovered
by action independent of the very conduct that gave rise to the violation.
In that way, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule will not be
undermined. At the same time, the government will not be unduly
penalized by the prohibition of the use of evidence that it would have
gotten even without the violation.
119. 560 So. 2d at 537.
120. See Nix, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S. Ct. 2501.
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